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systems theory, when first order, steady-state models 
of homeostasis became supplanted by those of self-
reference in observing systems … According to N. 
Katherine Hayles, the conferences’ singular achieve-
ment was to create a ‘new paradigm’ for ‘looking at 
human beings … as information-processing entities 
who are essentially similar to intelligent machines,’ by 
routing Claude Shannon’s information theory through 
Warren McCulloch’s ‘model of neural functioning’ and 
John von Neumann’s work in ‘biological systems’ and 
then capitalising on Norbert Wiener’s ‘visionary’ talent 
for disseminating the ‘larger implications’ of such a 
paradigm shift.3 
 
This quotation comes from Darrell Arnold’s summary 
book on systems theory, where in most contributions 
(for instance in architect Ranulph Glanville’s piece) 
general systems theory and cybernetics are aligned 
and the differences between them elided.4 Such 
differences nonetheless remain, and are neatly 
framed by physicist Egon Becker and ecologist 
Broder Breckling in their aptly-titled ‘Border Zone 
Between Ecology and Systems Theory’ where they 
state that:
Cybernetics is not merely a special case of General 
Systems Theory, nor has cybernetics ever developed 
fully within systems theory. The idea of circularity as a 
fundamental principle turned into the notion of ‘circular 
causality’ in the broad theoretical outline of cyber-
netics. Cybernetics thus acquired its own discursive 
order, shaped by questions concerning regulation and 
information transfer.5 
If the aim of a third-order cybernetics is to extend its 
reach to a fully relational account, from the essen-
tially ecological nature of so-called physical reality 
through to an associated relational hermeneutics 
of meaning, then what appears to be at stake is 
nothing less than the ontological question, consid-
ered as abstractly or broadly as possible: what is the 
nature of reality? More parochially, and as implied 
by the intermixing, here, of the scientific/technolog-
ical realm of ecology and cybernetics and the poetic 
realm of hermeneutics and meaning, architecture 
comes to be dis-covered or re-engaged into where 
it has in reality always sat, namely as a (taught, 
professional, creative) discipline that transcends 
the two cultures of science/technology and poetics/
meaning.1 Or rather, it undermines those gross 
strata of thought by means of an ongoing praxis both 
in the academy and the practice of architecture.2 In 
this it is nothing special: we are at a turn in culture 
where any discipline that is moving forward is going 
the same way by positively conjoining these two 
paths where possible, and radically undermining 
the dichotomy where necessary.
John Bruni (a researcher on the relations 
between literature and science) summarises the 
past history of cybernetics by reference to the 
Macy conferences. These conferences, held annu-
ally from 1946 onwards until the 1960s, brought 
together all the main contributors to cybernetic 
theory. He states: 
concepts such as information and feedback allowed the 
Macy Conferences to act as a catalyst for second-order 
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for the current debate, while wishing to explicitly 
avoid DeLanda’s de-politicised Deleuzian strain of 
architectural theory, in relation to which, see Eliot 
Albert’s comment on DeLanda’s ‘de-Marxification’ 
of Deleuze.11 This de-politicisation is shared with 
Sanford Kwinter and others, and could be summa-
rised under the banner of a rich architectural 
formalism of somewhat scientistic bent.12 To antici-
pate the argument in relation to architecture: if there 
is to be an antidote to this hylomorphic schematism 
in architecture – its continued concern primarily with 
the form or materiality of those objects we call build-
ings, a matter not unconnected with its role as a 
supporter of an unquestioned global capitalism – 
then this will come via the aforementioned joining of 
the paths of the humanities and science, rather than 
by simply translating the methods of common-or-
garden science into philosophy or more specifically 
ontology and architecture – something I believe was 
very far from the minds of Deleuze and Guattari.
But, on the other hand, I intend to start from the 
most extreme of scientific and technical thought, 
namely Claude Shannon’s information theory. 
Poetising science is no more effective than scien-
tistically transforming architecture and philosophy 
if we wish to understand the common ontology of 
both. Both need to be examined in their cybernetic 
and systematic extremes to show how they meet on 
the current horizon of thought.
Information theory and general systems
riverrun, past Eve and Adam’s, from swerve of shore 
to bend of bay, brings us by a commodious vicus of 
recirculation back to Howth Castle and Environs.
 Sir Tristram, violer d’amores, fr’over the short 
sea, had passen-core rearrived from North Amorica 
on this side the scraggy isthmus of Europe Minor to 
wielderfight his penisolate war: nor had topsawyer’s 
rocks by the stream Oconee exaggerated themselse 
to Laurens Country’s gorgios while they went doublin 
their mumper…13
I have a slight unease with the name cyber-
netics, coming as it does from the Greek term for 
‘governor’, and a similar unease (in this context) 
with the notions of regulation and human beings as 
information-processors. I will therefore refer mainly 
to ‘general systems theory’, also because this essay 
will engage with the inventor of this term, Ludwig von 
Bertalanffy.6 Whatever the name, what is essential 
is the bringing together of deep relational accounts 
of reality, the undermining of linear causality, the 
primacy of ‘information’ (the exact status of which 
is to be clarified in this essay), and the notion of 
general system, which, viewed in the most abstract 
terms possible, implies essentially mobile arrange-
ments (agencements), assemblages and ecologies.
As the use of such terms as agencement and 
assemblage imply, I will outline an ecologically 
informed ontology extending to the field of philos-
ophy. I will argue that the work of Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari is a coherent account of a philos-
ophy of systems, or specifically a systemic ontology 
– what they call in A Thousand Plateaus a mecha-
nosphere.7 This term signifies nothing less than the 
cosmos – the whole of reality – thought as a mobile 
and creative system or ‘machine’, with the proviso 
that these terms must be thought outside any 
mechanistic causality. The link between this work 
and cybernetics is clear from the very title, which 
comes from Gregory Bateson who, together with his 
wife Margaret Mead – both anthropologists – were 
regular and active participants in the Macy confer-
ences.8 His repurposing of the term ‘plateau’ to refer 
to the moment of an ongoing personal, emotional 
and sexual intensity in Balinese culture where the 
mother masturbates her son was repurposed again 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s title, where the to-and-
fro of this intensity already hints at their relational 
ontology.9 In addition, their link with the theory of 
complex systems is well known and has been 
promoted most thoroughly by Manuel DeLanda.10 
If my emphasis is slightly different, this is to high-
light Deleuze and Guattari’s indebtedness to earlier 
general systems theory in a manner constructive 
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light of cryptographic theory as a stochastic (that is, 
random) process of choosing from a set according 
to the probability of each member of that set, the 
set in the case of English having an ergodic struc-
ture (that is, statistically homogeneous – one area 
of the text is statistically similar to another) in the 
form of a Markoff process whereby the chances of 
one letter depend on the preceding letter (or letters, 
in the more sophisticated version). Of course, in 
reality, we don’t generally send random information 
down a telephone line, since that does not help us 
to communicate; but, perhaps counter-intuitively, an 
increase in the statistical randomness of a success-
fully-received message indicates an increase in the 
measure of information received.
We can see this in the case of Joyce. The 
quotation from Finnigans Wake has low redun-
dancy, which means a statistical analysis shows a 
high randomness, which in turn means that when 
it is communicated a lot of ‘information’ is passed 
on. The letter to Nora, by contrast, has the high 
redundancy of 50 per cent associated with standard 
English, which means that it is statistically relatively 
easy to predict what the next letter or word is going 
to be. This means that when it is communicated 
down an information channel, not so much informa-
tion is passed on.
Information is here being used in a strict tech-
nical and statistical sense, not in the way we usually 
think of information or meaning (unless we are scien-
tists or technicians speaking within our field). We 
might argue, for instance, that the letter to Nora has 
more information or meaning in it than Finnegans 
Wake, which we find hard to understand. Or we 
might argue the opposite – particularly if we were 
a literary critic – namely that the latter is fuller of 
poetic meaning than the former. We would certainly 
question whether Finnegans Wake is at all random, 
in the sense that we understand Joyce having spent 
decades on the novel, taking the greatest informed 
care for each word. That discussion is an inter-
esting and potentially aporetic one amenable, for 
instance, to a deconstructive reading; but is not one 
So begins James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake, cited 
by Shannon as an example of highly redundant 
English; that is, English where it is difficult to antici-
pate what the next letter or word will be. In contrast, 
take an extract from the same author’s letter to 
his lover Nora Barnacle: ‘It was you who slid your 
hand down inside my trousers and pulled my shirt 
softly aside and touched my prick’.14 This is written 
in standard English, which as Shannon points out 
has lower redundancy: ‘the redundancy of ordinary 
English, not considering statistical structure over 
greater distances than about eight letters, is roughly 
50 per cent.’15 You can assess this, he explains, by 
(among other methods) asking someone to fill in 
unknown letters having removed a random set of 
50 per cent of them.16 In other words, in standard 
English we only need half the letters to reconstruct 
the text and get the meaning, whereas in Finnegans 
Wake any removal of letters would prevent us from 
accurately reconstructing the text. (I make no 
comment here about the question of reconstructing 
its meaning.)
Shannon’s text is technical. He was essentially 
the inventor of pulse-code modulation (PCM) and 
was a researcher at Bell Laboratories. PCM is the 
method used to code continuous signals such as 
music, speech, or a visual image into discrete vari-
ables by sampling the amplitude of the waves at a 
given rate and as such forms the basis of all modern 
communication within the cyber realm (telephone 
lines, broadband, CD-ROMs, streaming and so on). 
His article A Mathematical Theory of Communication 
was an attempt – successful – to create a ‘modern 
theory of communication’; its seminal position lies 
not only in being at the technical original of today’s 
digital communication systems but also in the 
conceptual work he does on the notion of ‘informa-
tion’ and its link to entropy and thermodynamics, 
specifically the second law thereof whereby entropy 
in a closed system is held never to reduce.17 The 
task of communicating something efficiently over 
a telephone line – that is, producing information 
at a receiver – is considered abstractly and in the 
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variable; it has to be such that with increasing 
information of the same probability, there is more 
uncertainty (a longer message is more uncertain 
and conveys more information than a shorter one); 
and if we split the measure H into two measures of 
H for successive parts of the original message, the 
former is the weighted sum of the latter.21 The func-
tion that Shannon derives to calculate this measure 
H (equal to the negative of the sum of the various 
probabilities, each multiplied by its logarithm) is 
remarkably shown to be the same function as that 
of entropy within thermodynamics, specifically 
Boltzmann’s H theorem.22 Shannon therefore gives 
the name ‘entropy’ to the measure of information, a 
figure that can be made to lie somewhere between 
0 (zero information) and 1 (maximum information). 
This means that the value of entropy is one minus 
the redundancy: since Finnegans Wake has a low 
redundancy (high randomness), this means that the 
entropy is high and that a lot of information (close to 
the value 1) is sent down the information channel. 
Whereas Joyce’s letter to Nora has a redundancy 
of around 50 per cent, meaning that the entropy 
(measure of information sent) now drops to approxi-
mately 0.5.23
Why would Shannon have an intuition that the 
measure of information would be similar to that of 
entropy in a thermodynamic system? The reason 
is that he was thinking in terms of the formalism 
of these systems (information system or thermo-
dynamic system). I am taking the term formalism 
here in the same way as in, for instance, quantum 
physics where the word refers to the mathematics 
of the theory – how things are ‘slowed down’ 
to be expressed by mathematical functions.24 
Thermodynamics thinks of closed systems as a 
set of microstates (for instance, the movement of 
each molecule of gas within a closed container), 
the value of each of which has equal probability. 
These go to make up a given macrostate, the 
latter providing (by means of measurements of 
temperature, pressure and so on) a course-grained 
description of the gas in the box. The informational 
that is relevant to Shannon’s purposes. As Hayles 
points out, Shannon was careful to distinguish his 
technical terminology and thought from the usual 
‘subjective’ (as he put it) questions of meaning.18 
As he says, ‘these semantic aspects of communi-
cation are irrelevant to the engineering problem.’19 
That his definition might subsequently be misused 
– indeed within cybernetics, to a certain extent  – 
to redefine human communication in general in 
an inappropriately simplistic manner is merely a 
specific instance of the more general problem of an 
impatient misapplication of science and technology 
to broader questions of human life and the cosmos. 
Architecture has not been immune to this, and the 
counter-reaction has fathered a significant strand 
of hermeneutic architectural theory, for instance 
that of Dalibor Vesely and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, 
both of whose work is rooted in Edmund Husserl’s 
diagnosis of a crisis of signs in European science 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s contrast between the 
truth of the human sciences and the method of 
natural science and technology.20 But insofar as this 
strand of architectural theory is precisely that – a 
counter-reaction to an all-too-impatient application 
of technology to the problems of human science in 
general – one might ask if it falls into the opposite 
trap to the rival hylomorphic formalist architectural 
theory mentioned above; namely, it rejects the possi-
bility of a consilience between scientific method and 
humanist truth. Instead, this essay takes further the 
questions that science (in its systematic and infor-
mational guises) raises, to a point where they meet 
those of a philosophy of radical relation, symbiosis 
and ecology and thus render these traps irrele-
vant to a theory of architecture informed by such 
philosophy.
To return to Shannon: Finnegans Wake has 
lower redundancy than standard English and a 
higher statistical randomness. This means that rela-
tively more information is sent down the channel 
to the receiver. Shannon proves that if we want to 
provide a mathematical measure of this information, 
called ‘H’ (Greek eta), then H has to be a continuous 
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another example of science being too hastily and 
too abstractly applied; the general systems theo-
rist would ask, instead: has science even begun to 
model adequately a single neuron? (Answer: no, it 
is too complex.) And if not, what justifies the reduc-
tion of human brain function to that which we can, 
happenstance, begin to model, namely a network 
of neurons abstractly considered? This is not to 
depreciate what artificial intelligence and machine 
learning can achieve; merely to point to its limita-
tions vis-à-vis the human brain and other living 
systems.
General systems theory, on the other hand, 
tended towards the thermodynamic aspects of 
entropy, and information comes in more indirectly 
(in the manner outlined later in this essay). This 
is partly because its background was in biology, 
whereas cybernetics started from machine control 
and feedback. If we take Bertalanffy – a biologist 
– as emblematic of early systems theory, infor-
mation is not highly emphasised, but the flow 
of material and energy is, and to that extent he 
regards living systems as such flows within which 
feedback is one, but not necessarily the primary, 
phenomenon. This makes intuitive sense: a biolo-
gist, studying problems of how to characterise the 
organism in the light of early twentieth century 
debates around finalism and vitalism, and working 
experimentally with organisms of various scales, 
would perforce need to take into account issues of 
respiration, energy flow, input and output of mate-
rial (food, defecation) in order to think systemically. 
Bertalanffy’s 1940 article The Organism Considered 
as a Physical System already makes these points, 
and characterises the organism as an open system 
with a through-put of energy and material such that, 
in contrast to the second law of thermodynamics, 
the entropy is decreased and the organism is, or 
rather becomes, more and more finely ordered.27 
Organisms are essentially negentropy machines: 
machines for holding off entropy, increasing order 
by taking energy and matter from their environ-
ment. Ilya Prigogine will later clarify this activity as 
equivalent of the microstates are the values that 
the pieces of information (for example, letters of 
the English language) can take, and the total useful 
information measure (macrostate) is obtained in the 
same way that entropy was obtained, entropy being 
a (negative) measure of the useful energy in the 
thermodynamic system. On the other hand, within 
the thermodynamic system itself, entropy is related 
to information because the higher the entropy, the 
more information is needed to specify exactly what 
state it is in, since high entropy means high random-
ness and lack of ‘order’. Order is here put into scare 
quotes because this is the scientific definition of 
order – a definition which does not necessarily coin-
cide with our intuitive ideas of order for reasons that 
will become clearer below.
This relationship – what Bertalanffy would call 
an isomorphism – between entropy and informa-
tion, established in 1949, subsequently became 
important in the history of both cybernetics and 
general systems theory. Interestingly they each take 
a different tack in relation to it.25 Cybernetics, in the 
Macy conferences, indeed follows on directly from 
Shannon (although the seeds were already there in 
Wiener’s work) to consider entropy primarily in an 
informational sense, since it is the flow of information 
from one part of a system back to another ‘earlier’ 
part which drives the central cybernetic concept of 
feedback, be it positive feedback – self-reinforcing 
or a virtuous or vicious circle – or negative feedback, 
that is, the tendency of a system or subsystem to 
achieve homeostasis. As Hayles notes, information 
flow becomes a key issue for cybernetics, and with 
its second-order reflexive manifestation even more 
so, leading to an emphasis on formalising humans 
as ‘information-processing entities who are essen-
tially similar to intelligent machines’.26 This in turn 
generates the broad currents of thought around 
neural networks and informatics which, having 
determined the human brain as machinic sometimes 
go on to claim that a machine in the form of artificial 
intelligence can mimic and then go beyond what the 
human brain can achieve. This circular argument is 
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part of that broader theory largely because it now 
considers the whole gamut of systems within life 
and cements ecological thinking as a key compo-
nent of our modern age. On the horizontal axis, 
similarly, Bertalanffy in the 1950s and 1960s was 
already widening the scope of systems thinking 
to become what he saw as a truly general theory, 
covering many aspects of reality including culture 
and the human sciences. In that sense he saw 
Russell’s analytical thinking as a subset of general 
systems theory: analysis can occur within systems 
thinking, but systems thinking cannot be circum-
scribed by mere analysis.
In a series of essays collected in General System 
Theory, Bertalanffy outlines and justifies this broad-
ening of scope. He shows the limitations of ‘the 
analytic, mechanistic, one-way-causal paradigm of 
classic science’ by proposing a new paradigm – a 
‘theory of “systems” in the various sciences (e.g. 
physics, biology, psychology, social sciences)’.33 
As well as making vertical links to dynamic ecology 
and the ethology of Jacob von Uexküll (particularly 
relevant to the connection I will make with Deleuze 
and Guattari below), establishing or clarifying crit-
ical notions such as equifinality, isomorphism and 
emergence, arguing against analogies and meta-
phors (‘analogies are scientifically worthless’) in 
science and promoting systemic explanations and 
models, he makes the vital step of considering the 
epistemological issues involved.34 It is worthwhile 
quoting his comments on this issue at some length:
The epistemology (and metaphysics) of logical posi-
tivism or empiricism was determined by the ideas 
of physicalism, atomism, and the ‘camera-theory’ of 
knowledge [i.e. a naïve realist view of knowledge]. 
These, in view of present-day knowledge, are obsolete 
… simple ‘reduction’ to the elementary particles and 
conventional laws of physics does not appear feasible. 
Compared to the analytical procedure of classical 
science with resolution into component elements and 
one-way or linear causality as basic category [sic.], the 
investigation of organized wholes of many variables 
that of a dissipative structure, whereby the negent-
ropy within the structure (the organism) is balanced 
by an increase of entropy which it discharges (by 
means of waste, and so on) into the environment.28 
The fact that living systems are open systems is 
a truism today, but Bertalanffy was revolutionary, 
since science up to that point had almost exclusively 
theorised closed systems within a mechanistic 
framework. He was therefore calling for a different 
approach to the nature of the reality considered by 
science, a matter that extended beyond biology into 
broader ontological and epistemological issues. As 
he points out, it was still possible in 1948 for analyt-
ical philosophy, in the person of Bertrand Russell, 
to dismiss the importance of systematic thinking, 
that is, thinking that considered the place of parts 
within a whole. Russell considered, on the contrary, 
that all thought should proceed by the method of 
analysis – that is, the taking apart of things and the 
consideration of their parts; and that all knowledge, 
scientific or not, was to be obtained and could be 
obtained by this essentially Aristotelean method.29
Hyper-relational general systems theory
General systems theory, established by Bertalanffy 
in the 1940s, reaches its apogee in the 1970s, a 
high-point well expressed by the publication of the 
monumental volume Living Systems by James 
Grier Miller.30 This is essential reading for any histo-
rian of systems theory; rigorous in both content and 
form, inspired partly by his initial training in philos-
ophy with Alfred North Whitehead (whose Process 
and Reality would, on a longer account, be tied into 
our story), it sets out to describe the whole organo-
sphere, from the basic unit of the cell through six 
further vertical levels of organ, organism, group, 
organisation, community, society and supranational 
system.31 The introduction to Living Systems gives 
perhaps the best available summary of general 
systems theory, within which it characterises cyber-
netics as a (fairly small) component.32 The book 
represents a vertical deepening and generalising 
of systems theory, and takes cybernetics as a 
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other hand, the fate of general systems theory is 
to have become, in scientific terms and despite the 
provisos I raise above, almost de rigueur; one only 
has to think, for instance, of genetics and epige-
netics, where research focuses on understanding 
and intervening in the extraordinarily complex inter-
active machines operating at lightning speed – that 
is, systems – making up our cells’ reproductive 
apparatus.38 Incidentally, here is an instance where 
the use of the shortcut metaphorical language of 
‘reading’, ‘copying’, ‘alphabet’ and so on of DNA 
can sometimes obscure clarity, as Bertalanffy would 
note. DNA is not read, there is no copying, there 
is no alphabet; what there are are little machines, 
doing what machines do… More pertinently for our 
purposes, in the field of quantum physics all serious 
thinking is now systematic and highly relational; 
this systemic thinking derives partly from the earlier 
more limited notions of closed thermodynamic and 
other systems, but is informed as we will see by a 
similar hyper-relational thought to that of Bertalanffy.
Hyper-relational philosophy
To address the first of these points, as previously 
intimated it is in the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
that we see most evidence of this hyper-relational 
thought in philosophy.39 In A Thousand Plateaus 
and elsewhere, they frame the real as having the 
character of an ‘assemblage’ or a ‘machine’.40 
These, in essence, are systems – but a particular 
type of system consonant with Bertalanffy, which 
moves on from the static qualities of structuralism 
(which Deleuze aligned himself with somewhat in 
the 1960s) and, perhaps under the influence of 
Guattari, takes on a mobile and dynamic aspect.41 
In that regard, they appropriate Bergson’s notion 
of becoming and raise it to a central place in their 
philosophy: nothing is, everything is becoming or in 
becoming at the same time as constantly being in 
relation to other things.42 Deleuze had already estab-
lished the primacy of difference in his earlier book 
Difference and Repetition; what he means by this 
is that identity is derived from – an epiphenomenon 
requires new categories of interaction, transaction, 
organization, teleology etc. … Furthermore, percep-
tion is not a reflection of ‘real things’ (whatever their 
metaphysical status) and knowledge is not a simple 
approximation to ‘truth’ or ‘reality’. It is an interaction 
between knower and known… Physics itself tells us 
that there are no ultimate entities like corpuscles or 
waves, existing independent of the observer.35
It seems to me that this extract, from the 1971 British 
edition foreword, is remarkable in drawing out some 
lessons from general systems theory that have yet 
to make their way through science, let alone other 
fields of knowledge. An example: when consid-
ering how a respiratory virus operates, science still 
rarely takes a dynamic systems approach. One 
hears analogies such as that the lungs are like a 
sponge; but already in a 1969 paper Bertalanffy 
was pointing out that the pulmonary alveolar cells 
in the lung have an average renewal time of only 
six days; in this context the fact that viruses destroy 
lung cells becomes, evidently, a dynamic systems 
issue requiring complex explanation, not static anal-
ogies; in turn, clearly the action of a virus has to 
be seen as taking on and working as a significant 
part of much broader systems than the lungs, such 
as (upwards) cultural, transport, social and polit-
ical systems and (sideways) the immune system, 
temperature control system and hormone systems 
of the body. The question is systemic and ecolog-
ical from top to bottom and all the way across, in 
a manner which Bertalanffy would already recog-
nise in the 1960s. Despite this, however, and aside 
from a few researchers such as David Pouvreau, 
his work is now largely ignored, and his influence 
unrecognised.36
I believe we can summarise Bertalanffy’s 
thought as essentially hyper-relational. On the one 
hand we can see this hyper-relationality in those 
philosophers who, likewise – and likewise influ-
enced by Whitehead’s process philosophy – take 
relations as the foundation of ontology and an 
associated and intermixed epistemology.37 On the 
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Simondon’s idea of transduction which, as Bernard 
Stiegler glosses it (virtually quoting Deleuze), is ‘a 
relation which constitutes its terms’.51
There is therefore a strong conceptual likeness 
between the generality and priority of relations in 
Bertalanffy’s general systems theory and the prior-
itising of transductive relations and difference in the 
post-Nietzschean philosophy of Derrida, Deleuze 
and Guattari.52 In the case of Deleuze and Guattari, 
there are some more specific common interests. 
One of these I have already mentioned: Bertalanffy’s 
use of the ethological theory of Jakob von Uexküll, 
specifically reference to the latter’s book A Foray into 
the Worlds of Animals and Humans.53 Bertalanffy’s 
1955 summary of this theory, particularly the invo-
cation of Uexküll’s famous ethology/ecology of 
the tick, could be taken directly from Deleuze and 
Guattari’s later reference in A Thousand Plateaus: 
Take, for instance, a tick lurking in the bushes for a 
passing mammal in whose skin it settles and drinks 
itself full of blood. The signal is the odor of butyric 
acid, flowing from the dermal glands of all mammals. 
Following this stimulus, it plunges down; if it fell on 
a warm body – as monitored by its sensitive thermal 
sense – it has reached its prey, a warm-blooded 
animal, and only needs to find, aided by tactile sense, 
a hair-free place to pierce in.54 
A further conceptual link is the aversion to metaphor 
and analogies on the part of Bertalanffy in relation to 
scientific explanations: as noted above, he regards 
them as useless. In fact, this follows, logically, 
from his hyper-relationality: metaphor assumes 
that there is indeed an original ‘natural’ meaning of 
words which metaphor can then translate into other 
contexts.55 The relational take is to disavow this 
belief and wager instead for the interplay from the 
outset of supposed original and supposed derived 
meanings. This aversion he shares with Deleuze, 
who from beginning to end of his philosophy 
avoids the metaphorical use of words, for the same 
reason.56
of – difference, and not the other way around, as 
philosophy and thought had almost always framed 
it.43 To place difference first, at the basis of things, 
is to privilege relations and the interplay of being – 
precisely a hyper-relationality. This is a Nietzschean 
theme, since Deleuze sees in Nietzsche the one 
who frames the world as the interplay of forces, 
and when he says ‘the eternal return of the same’ 
he means, for Deleuze, not the return of the same 
thing, but that ‘the same’ (and being) is said of that 
which eternally returns.44 Being is said of – derived 
from – becoming, not vice versa.45 In this, Deleuze 
interplays with the early work of Jacques Derrida 
and in particular his new concept (as Deleuze 
says) of différance.46 Différance means the differen-
tial origin of difference – a concept which Deleuze 
picks up on in Difference and Repetition.47 Deleuze 
quotes Derrida at some length, from Writing and 
Difference, including the following: ‘To say that diffé-
rance is originary is simultaneously to erase the 
myth of a present origin.’48 The erasure of a present 
origin is precisely the erasure of being in favour of 
différance or becoming; again, a hyper-relationality, 
posited as the basis for a new, Nietzsche-inspired 
philosophy.
Perhaps the clearest exposition of the extreme 
relational quality of this philosophy is contained in 
Deleuze’s notion of the fold. Contrary to certain 
simplistic architectural interpretations of this 
concept, what Deleuze asks us to think in relation 
to the Baroque and Leibniz in his book The Fold 
is Leibniz’s notion that reality consists of folds to 
infinity. ‘The Baroque fold unfurls all the way to 
infinity’ and ‘a fold is always folded within a fold, like 
a cavern in a cavern.’49 This statement is to be taken 
literally, which means that it is the fold which comes 
first (différance at the origin); folding produces the 
material which is folded, as an after-effect, as an 
epiphenomenon of the fold. As Deleuze says else-
where: relations are external to their terms.50 It 
is relations (that is, the fold) that come first; they 
retrospectively ‘make’ the terms between which 
the relations occur, a theme taken up from Gilbert 
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information about one another, with no need for a mind 
to play any role.58
The exposition here is beautiful, as quantum 
physics can be, but we need to look at two more 
technical articles from the same author to unwind 
the concepts, make the connection with entropy, 
and reveal the full hyper-relationality of this thinking. 
Rovelli’s 2013 article on the topic starts by ques-
tioning the notion of entropy.59 As previously noted, 
the second law of thermodynamics states that, in 
a closed system, entropy always increases. This 
makes it sound as though entropy is some absolute 
quality, and indeed many interpret this law to say 
that the universe will, eventually, die a heat death 
as entropy increases to the limit. This, however, is 
to assume something that we cannot know, namely 
that the universe is indeed a closed system (inci-
dentally this notion of thermodynamic heat death is 
something Nietzsche had already critiqued in the 
late nineteenth century, as Deleuze notes).60 What 
Rovelli points out is that entropy is always rela-
tive to the relevant functions of the system being 
investigated, that the laws of thermodynamics deal 
with the relative coupling of two systems, and that 
entropy is indeed information, as per Shannon, 
since it is defined as ‘the number of microstates 
compatible with a given macrostate’ – a definition 
that accords with our discussions above. Here is 
the hyper-relationality: ‘the information relevant in 
physics is always the relative information between 
two systems.’ He gives this fact a poetic bent: ‘it is 
not the microstate of the Sun which is hot, it is the 
manner in which the Sun affects the Earth which 
is objectively hot.’61 We could say here that what 
Rovelli is doing is reframing objectivity – or, the 
notion of the absolute – in terms of relationality. The 
absolute, or that which is objective, is an epiphe-
nomenon of the relative. 
Thus entropy and information are always rela-
tive. If we break a cup by dropping it onto the floor, 
there is usually thought to be an increase in entropy 
– that is, an increase in disorder – but this depends, 
Hyper-relational science
I turn now to the second point, that of the current 
position of science at its relational extreme 
– namely, how quantum physics is being concep-
tualised by those scientists most attuned to the 
transductive question of hyper-relationality.57 We 
return here also to the key topic of information, in 
its relational aspect, because it is fair to say that the 
concept of information is now the driver of cutting-
edge quantum mechanics, both in its theoretical 
manifestations and the practical realm of quantum 
computing.
Again, here, we have to be careful about the 
use of the word ‘information’. In quantum physics 
it is used in a specific sense, deriving indeed from 
Shannon’s 1949 seminal paper. Seminal, it turns 
out, not only in establishing the practical basis of 
our modern cyber technologies, but also in estab-
lishing a theoretical framework that extends well 
beyond those practical issues. The most succinct 
exposition of quantum information is available in 
Carlo Rovelli’s essay, available online, on relative 
information, which is brief and accessible enough 
for me to recommend that the reader glance quickly 
through it before proceeding. Rovelli is one of the 
most eminent quantum physicists working in the 
field, and his expositions have the benefit of both 
attempting to drill down to the broadest implications 
of quantum theory, and expressing these in intuitive 
language. He outlines the concept of relative infor-
mation as a scientific notion distinct from meaning. 
This concept is ‘just physical’, he says. He states: 
In nature, variables are not independent; for instance, 
in any magnet, the two ends have opposite polari-
ties. Knowing one amounts to knowing the other. So 
we can say that each end ‘has information’ about the 
other. There is nothing mental in this; it is just a way of 
saying that there is a necessary relation between the 
polarities of the two ends. We say that there is ‘relative 
information’ between two systems anytime the state 
of one is constrained by the state of the other. In this 
precise sense, physical systems may be said to have 
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not allowing relationality to run all the way down. 
Whole books have been written bewailing the unac-
ceptable state of quantum physics as violating basic 
common sense.69 What Rovelli does is to re-write 
this common sense.
Nonetheless, in his account there remains 
the residual metaphor of the term ‘information’. 
However deep our understanding of Shannon, and 
however much we accept the necessary abstraction 
made in the scientific definition of this word, it does 
not denote precisely enough what Rovelli is refer-
ring to. When he says, for instance, that 
the light that arrives at our eyes carries information 
about the objects which it has played across; the 
color of the sea has information on the color of the 
sky above it; a cell has information about the virus 
attacking it
this remains open to the critique of Bertalanffy and 
Deleuze that ‘information’ here is an analogy or 
metaphor, and is being used in two very different 
instances.70 There is too much humanity in this term 
– humanity which needs to be expunged entirely 
in order to secure the thought that this is not to do 
with a limitation of our supposed subjectivity, but is 
to do with the very structure of the world. This, in 
turn, prevents Rovelli from taking the final step and 
allowing relation to take precedence; in the end, 
he wagers for the existence of those elementary 
objects which Bertalanffy had already warned us 
against in 1971; he remains wedded to Democritus’s 
notion of the atom (about whom he has written a 
book) instead of Heraclitus’s notion of flow – the 
latter a notion shared, of course, with Deleuze and 
Guattari. Rovelli says that information is ‘the infinite 
game of mirrors reflecting one another formed [sic] 
the correlations among the structures made by the 
elementary objects.’71 In other words, the ‘elemen-
tary objects’ remain part of his theory, which is why 
‘information’ remains the word that he chooses to 
use. And this despite quoting Zurek on the rela-
tive non-existence of ‘properties themselves’: 
Rovelli says, on the position of the observer: it is 
possible to conceive of a situation where the cup 
breaking on the floor, if the pieces land on an 
image of those pieces visible to a certain observer, 
increases order rather than decreases it.62
Rovelli has bigger fish to fry. In his 2008 article 
Relational Quantum Mechanics, this concept of 
relative information allows the derivation of quantum 
physics from the same hyper-relative ground. What 
Rovelli proves is that in quantum terms, ‘different 
observers give different accounts of the same 
sequence of events.’63 What this means, in general 
systems terms, is that quantum physics deals with 
the broadest of all systems, where the system 
includes the ‘observer’.64 There is no escaping the 
system, and the results of any quantum experiment 
depend on the way that an experiment is set up – as 
the famous example of the double slit experiment 
invariably shows.65 For quantum physics, there is 
no pre-existing real condition that the foundational 
experiments reveal; rather, these experiments 
create that condition that we subsequently take for 
real.66
Rovelli is one of a group of quantum physi-
cists who are willing to accept this transductive 
hyper-relationality; others include Christopher 
Fuchs, Wojciech Hubert Zurek and N. David 
Mermin’s so-called Ithaca interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.67 What their views imply is a rejection 
of a naïve realist ontology of the world – that is, the 
‘camera’ notion of our relationship to the world that 
somehow our perceptions are of some pre-existing 
absolute reality. Rather, we are systemically inter-
twined within reality, such that the intertwining 
and interrelations create that reality.68 There are 
many quantum scientists who still take the naïve 
realist view, and the supposed ‘weirdness’ of 
quantum physics derives entirely from our habit of – 
consciously or unconsciously – remaining wedded 
to it. This can be seen in many of the competing 
interpretations of quantum physics, such as the 
many-worlds theory, or the hidden variables theory; 
these are basically ways of ‘saving the object’, of 
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Conclusion
Taking this hyper-relational step explains, for 
instance, why mathematics is so successful in 
explaining the world scientifically. Such success is 
puzzling if the world is made of entities. By what 
right would an entity enter into relations such that 
they accord with mathematics? But the problem 
disappears if the world is essentially transductive, 
made of pure relations. For what is mathematics 
other than the science and art of pure relations? If 
entities are an epiphenomenon of relations, which 
are more ‘basic’ than them, then the ‘correlation’ 
between maths and nature becomes self-evident.
Similarly, what is the relation between the mind 
and the brain, that is, between consciousness and 
the physical reality of our embodied brain? There 
remain endless debates around this so-called hard 
question of consciousness.74 But the problem, 
again, disappears if we regard the physical brain as 
a transductive epiphenomenon of relations, since 
what the mind is, is nothing other than the ability 
(conscious and unconscious) to spin, endlessly, 
relations among themselves.75 Spinoza says: the 
mind and the body are the same thing.76 Perhaps 
we are getting to the point where we can under-
stand the profundity of this statement.
What, then, is the relevance of this journey for 
architecture, as a taught, professional and creative 
discipline? I have shown that the relations inherent 
in systems and ecological thinking go all the way 
down, and all the way across. There is no scope 
for a naïve realist interpretation of reality in general: 
that ontology is defunct. But physicists and stubborn 
realist philosophers are not the only ones to revert 
to it. Architects, and the discipline of architecture, 
remains wedded to such a realist interpretation of 
things, perhaps because we spend too much time 
with large objects that we call buildings. But the build-
ings are mere epiphenomena of broader political, 
interpersonal, ecological and essentially relational 
matters, assemblages, systems and interplays.
This might mean something quite simple in 
practice: a slight shift. As one cybernetic architect 
‘correlations between the properties of quantum 
systems are more basic than the properties them-
selves’.72 Zurek is explicit about what this means: 
‘This order of importance, in which a correlation – a 
record of a property – comes before the property, 
reverses the ordinary hierarchy to which one is 
accustomed within the realm of everyday experi-
ence’, in other words, is counter to the naïve realist 
viewpoint which places entities (being) before rela-
tions (becoming).73
Why take this final step? Why dispose, in 
the end (or at the beginning) of any notion of the 
common-sense object, of the entity, of the ‘elemen-
tary object’ or the Democritian atom? This seems 
to me to be simply a question of utilising Occam’s 
razor: do not multiply explanations! Rovelli, and 
others, have shown that we cannot do without a 
notion of relation; Deleuze and Bertalanffy give us 
the hyper-relationality of a general systems theory 
and a philosophy of the assemblage (mobile, 
dynamic system). Quantum physics itself – the 
most accurate of scientific theories – shows us that 
it is the relations between things that give rise to 
the phenomena that are then called, for conveni-
ence’s sake, ‘particles’. The particle-quality of these 
supposed elementary particles does not exist; they 
occur as epiphenomena of the relations which occur 
in relational systems. The term that should there-
fore be used to replace ‘information’ describes more 
precisely what is being said: it is simply the word 
‘relation’ itself. When Rovelli describes the interplay 
between the light of the sky and colour of the sea he 
is not talking about information so much as about 
the relations between these things.
This is the final and most pertinent conceptual 
link I wish to make in this article, in order to draw 
the conclusion that we are now at a stage where we 
can not only envisage but also deploy a common 
relational conceptuality across philosophy and 
science, and with that, across the whole of human 
endeavour both practical and theoretical.
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‘governorship’ aspect of cybernetics; not that control 
as such is a bad thing seen in a broader scope – more 
that if taken as the essence, or the beginning not only 
historically but also ideally, of cybernetics/systems 
theory, then the more creative aspects of systems 
thought which Deleuze and Guattari emphasise (‘the 
production of the new’) potentially gets covered over in 
the name of some form of determinism.
4. Where he states: 
The Macy thematic statement uses the word 
‘system’. Around the time that cybernetics was 
reborn (1946), the first article specifically on 
general systems theory was published by the biol-
ogist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. He claimed to have 
developed this theory in lectures starting in 1937. 
Simplistically stated, Bertalanffy’s general systems 
theory was the base that spawned the assorted 
variety of systems sciences that we have now. 
Cyberneticians and systemists have always under-
stood that there was a connection between their two 
fields. Some see the terms as synonyms … People 
such as Gordon Pask insisted they didn’t care what 
name was used. 
Ranulph Glanville, ‘Cybernetics: Thinking Through the 
Technology’, 45–77 in Traditions of Systems Theory, 46. 
Disclosure: Glanville taught the present author.
5. Becker and Broder Breckling, ‘Border Zone Between 
Ecology and Systems Theory’, 385–403 in Ecology 
Revisited, ed. Astrid Schwarz and Kurt Jax (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2011), 388.
6. Left out of the account here for reasons of space is 
the tektology of Aleksandr Bogdanov dating from the 
second decade of the twentieth century, which, as 
environmental philosopher Arran Gare has argued 
(in ‘Aleksandr Bogdanov and Systems Theory’, 
Democracy and Nature 6, no. 3 (2000): 341) predates 
and probably influenced Bertallanfy’s general systems 
theory. Tektology is the ‘new science of organisation’ 
invented by Bogdanov, a process-philosophy entirely 
consonant with the hyper-relationality I argue for in 
this essay. See, among other writings by Bogdanov, 
– Cedric Price – said to a potential client: ‘you do 
not need a house, you need a divorce’.77 What 
Price meant was this: your relations, the symbiotic 
ecosystem within which you relate to your wife, is 
in a certain state. Do not expect a mere object to 
rectify it! I, as an architect and cyberneticist, will not 
play the game of reducing the issues to objective 
ones. Let’s work with, intervene in, and (over-) turn 
the system, the set of relations, even at the expense 
of not building anything.
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